Optimalism
In this text we will work out the optimal religious beliefs using common-sense observations and reason, without relying in any way on tradition, rhetoric, or purported revelations. This might sound implausible, or at least excessively ambitious. But it is not as hard as it seems.
For millennia philosophers have used pragmatic arguments to rationalize religious beliefs. We will simply turn that old approach on its head. Instead of starting from existing beliefs and searching for goods they produce here and now, we will start from nothing and search for precisely the beliefs that produce the maximum good here and now.
Terms
D.1. Optimal religion.
We define the optimal religion as the religion that (a.) does more net good in the present life than any other religion or irreligion, regardless of purported effects in the afterlife or any other justifications grounded in unknowables; and (b.) agrees with basic religious intuitions, provided the latter do not impinge on the former.
This definition requires explanation. We will go through the terms one by one to clarify.
D.2. Good, bad, benefit, and harm.
Good refers collectively to happiness, virtue, quality, moral dutifulness, and so forth, not just one of these in isolation. The same applies to related terms such as bad, benefit, and harm.
Some philosophers make the mistake of defining the good in a narrow sense. That is, only happiness, or only moral duty, or only virtue. This leads to artificial conundrums, unproductive debates, and wrong answers. People disagree about how to weight different kinds of good. Narrow definitions do not resolve this. They only degrade weighing accuracy.
Due to this variation in weights, what is good and to what extent are matters that must be determined by the individual. To ensure agreement with as many readers as possible, we will base our arguments on consensus goods. Unless we specify otherwise, we will evaluate the good with respect to the present life alone.
D.3. Spirit.
A spirit refers to a persistent non-physical entity capable of consciousness, which may or may not be accompanied by various other traits. As we are spirits, we will often write in the first person plural with the same meaning. While spirit is a word sometimes associated with mysticism, our definition is precise and technical. The reader should attend to this and note that we always use the word circumspectly.
D.4. World.
By a world we mean everything that both follows a consistent fundamental order and is accessible to spirits in principle without an intervening death. Thus, distant galaxies are in our world but other universes that are inaccessible from this one in principle are not.
D.5. Afterlife.
The afterlife refers broadly to anywhere the spirit persists after the present life ends.
D.6. Entelecheia.
We define entelecheia as the manner of acting and cognizing that is most appropriate to a particular spirit. Note that we do not assume a spirit's entelecheia or any other traits are predetermined, unchanging, or independent of other entities.
D.7. Development.
We define development as the creation and realization of entelecheia.
D.8. Divinity.
Divinity refers to a sacred, conscious being with superhuman traits that are not subject to natural laws nor dependent on an ordinary physical body.
D.9. Knowns and unknowns.
We define knowns as claims that have been validated and unknowns as claims that have not been validated.
D.10. Knowables and unknowables.
We define knowables as claims that can in principle be validated within this world. We define unknowables as claims that cannot in principle be validated within this world.
D.11. Religion, science, and superstition.
We define religious beliefs as beliefs about unknowables that do not conflict with knowns. We define scientific beliefs as beliefs about knowables that are validated by knowns. A religion is a coherent system of religious beliefs, while science is the coherent system of scientific beliefs.
These definitions ensure that science and religion inhabit separate domains and can never conflict. When so-called religious beliefs conflict with knowns, they are not religion but superstition. When so-called scientific beliefs are not fully justified by knowns, they are not science, but speculation, or outright falsehood.
D.12. Basic religious intuitions.
We call three widespread religious intuitions basic. Crucially, we do not assume they are valid, nor that the reader shares them. We only define them as nominally basic. These are that (a.) the spirit survives the death of the body and persists in an afterlife, (b.) divinity exists in some form, and (c.) moral behavior is recognized in some fashion connected to a and b.
D.13. Beliefs must conform with fundamental principles of reason.
Any valid set of beliefs must be logically sound, non-contradictory, and parsimonious. This applies to religious beliefs as well as scientific ones.
D.14. Belief is not free.
An unproven belief as such must be counted as a cost. The more difficult it is to hold, the more it does harm by straining our probity. Every optimal belief must be justified by benefits that outweigh this cost. Arbitrary or ad hoc beliefs are particularly difficult to hold, and can only be justified by large benefits.
D.15. Optimal religion revisited.
Now we can reread the opening definition with complete understanding. The optimal religion is the religion that (a.) does more net good in the present life than any other religion or irreligion, regardless of purported effects in the afterlife or any other justifications grounded in unknowables; and (b.) agrees with basic religious intuitions, provided the latter do not impinge on the former.
The optimal religion is by definition not merely free from any risk of sacrificing the known for the unknowable. We come out ahead for believing it even if it proves completely wrong.
D.16. Optimal religious beliefs.
An optimal religious belief is a belief the optimal religion necessarily includes. When we call a specific belief optimal or not optimal in the course of our argument we will often mean this provisionally. An optimal belief must be compatible with a system of beliefs that is superior to other systems. This can only be established definitively after the full system is assembled.
D.17. These definitions enable a rational solution based on consensus values.
Some may object to our definition of optimal and argue for the primacy of faith. For the time being they should treat the definition as a mere convenience. Unlike alternatives, it sets up a puzzle we can solve with only reason and broadly shared values. Whether one would do better to have faith in some other religion that is not optimal by this definition is a legitimate question we will address when the solution to the puzzle is complete.
The remaining terms will be useful in later chapters of this text. You may wish to skim them now and review them again when they appear.
D.18. Task.
We mean task in the broadest possible sense, as something that is to be done.
D.19. Realms.
By a realm we mean a set of worlds with the same fundamental order.
D.20. Lower realm.
The lower realm consists of worlds (a.) where all information has physical correlates whose behavior follows physical laws, (b.) that are causally closed, and (c.) that are composed solely of mutually dependent entities whose entelecheia and actions are not predetermined by God.
D.21. Upper realm.
The upper realm consists of worlds curated by God to be maximally good. By curated, we mean that God interferes to select, guide, determine, or limit entities therein to the extent necessary.
D.22. Middle realm.
The middle realm consists of causally open worlds that are not curated by God to be maximally good, and where entities are mutually dependent.
D.23. Liminal realm.
The liminal realm consists of causally open worlds where spirits can access their past stores of information and are not mutually dependent.
D.24. Higher realms.
We will sometimes collectively refer to the upper and middle realms as the higher realms. The lower and liminal realms are not included in this grouping.
D.25. Compossible.
We define compossible spirits as those who can live maximally good lives in the same world as other spirits who are also living maximally good lives, and incompossible spirits as those who cannot.
With these terms defined, we will proceed to the main argument.
I. God
I.1. The problem of evil.
If an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God (D.8.) existed, He would presumably eliminate all evils. Yet there are many known evils. Thus, it seems as if He cannot exist. This is known as the problem of evil. To determine whether it is optimal to believe in such a God, we must first determine whether we can solve this problem.
I.2. Freedom justifies the existence of evil.
The solution to the problem of evil (I.1.) begins as follows. All evils in our world are caused by the free action of entities. Infringing on the free action of entities is worse than allowing the evils it causes. God is therefore justified in allowing those evils.
To justify natural evils like earthquakes, we must apply this logic to all entities, including the most elementary. We will call these maximally elementary entities particles.
We must now explain why the freedom of particles is valuable enough to justify natural evils. To do this we will propose an account of creation. It does not need to be the only possible account of creation. It only needs to be credible and solve the problem at hand.
I.3. The optimal account of creation.
God wishes to develop a variety of entities beyond Himself that will participate in creation, but without predetermining their entelecheia (D.6.) or actions. To accomplish this, He first creates a world of particles whose behavior is partly free. Some of these particles join into organic structures. The organic structures then develop into more complex entities. Rather than being predetermined, their entelecheia and actions evolve from their repeated interactions.
The freedom of particles is valuable not for its own sake, but because it is the means God uses to develop entities without determining their entelecheia or actions. If God were to infringe on this freedom He would contravene His aim. Therefore, God must allow natural evils.
This completes the solution to the problem of evil (I.1.).
I.4. Colloquial definitions of freedom and benevolence are insufficient.
In our account of creation we have used the word free where the word random might seem more appropriate. A free action is one not determined by some law or cause. Any such act will appear random. So freedom and randomness are empirically indistinguishable. Furthermore, the argument above (I.2., I.3.) retains equal validity if we replace the word free with the word random. So regardless of which word we choose, there is no sleight of hand in announcing a solution to the problem of evil (I.1.).
Our definition of benevolent has also drifted away from the colloquial one. When we say benevolent, we usually mean doing good as humans in this world see it (D.2.). In the above account of creation, God values freedom more than we do. Nevertheless, it is natural for different beings to value different goods and for the local good to differ from the universal good (D.2.). And to the extent that we can envision God's perspective, the view of the good we have imputed to Him is credible. For being omniscient and omnipotent, God can only create something truly beyond Himself by means of indeterminacy. And if this something is to be complex and generated by a process that unfolds in time, then God must refrain from infringing on that indeterminacy until the process is complete. The freedom of particles is plausibly the best of all possible ways to create undetermined entities.
Thus, there is a gap between the good as God sees it and the good as we see it. But this gap does not refute the solution to the problem of evil.
I.5. Other attempts to solve the problem of evil fail.
There are many other attempts to solve the problem of evil, but none of them succeed. For instance, the multiverse theodicy, which proposes that God created all possible net-good worlds, would make decisions morally meaningless and cause the fraction of worlds including an excess of low-probability event sequences to approach unity. The former is suboptimal, and the latter is infinitely close to contradicting knowns, giving it a negligible chance of being correct. This particular refutation is detailed in the addenda (A.1.). But we will not take time to review every failed attempt.
I.6. If it is optimal to believe God exists, it is also optimal to believe the above account of creation.
The solution to the problem of evil stated above (I.2.) is the only successful one, and the account of creation stated above is the only way to complete it while conforming with knowns (I.3., I.5.). It follows that if we are to believe an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God exists, we must also believe this account of creation.
I.7. It is optimal to believe an omnibenevolent God exists.
We look positively on the existence of benevolent beings. So the belief that an omnibenevolent being exists increases our happiness. If God is omnibenevolent He is certain to love us. And if He loves us, He will act for our benefit. Feeling loved by someone who will act for our benefit increases our happiness still more.
Were God's benevolence limited, we could not be certain He would love us. Any specific restrictions on the circle of His benevolence would be arbitrary, and therefore hard to credit (D.14.). It follows that belief in an omnibenevolent God is optimal (D.1.).
I.8. It is optimal to believe God is omnipotent.
Power is only meaningful to the extent it can be exerted, and the solution to the problem of evil implies God does not interfere with the present world in principle (I.2.). Hence, His power can only be meaningful in other domains. Two such domains present themselves. First, creation (I.3.). Believing God created the world increases our feeling that life has order and meaning, which increases our happiness. And creation requires vast power. Second, the afterlife. If the optimal afterlife can only be managed by the intelligent application of vast power, then it is optimal to believe God has vast power. We will later demonstrate that this condition is met.
It is easier to believe God is omnipotent than that He is powerful enough to create the world and manage the afterlife without being omnipotent (D.14.). Nor is there a compelling reason to suppose His power is limited. Thus, it is optimal to believe God is omnipotent.
I.9. It is optimal to believe God is omniscient.
To love us thoroughly (I.7.), God must know us thoroughly. Nor is there any non-arbitrary reason to suppose God would know some of His creatures and not others (D.14.). Furthermore, God would need to know a great deal in order to create the world and manage the afterlife (I.3.). Finally, it is optimal to believe God is omnipotent (I.8.), and omnipotence implies the power to know all that can be known. Thus, it is optimal to believe God is omniscient.
I.10. It is optimal to believe God shares our experiences, empathizes with our struggles, and is always present with us.
God is omniscient and benevolent (I.7., I.9.). An omniscient God knows everything in full. This necessarily includes every detail of our experiences. To the extent God shares every detail of our experiences, he is always present with us. And a benevolent God who knows our struggles will empathize.
Even if all this did not follow directly, belief would still be optimal (D.1.). For the belief that God shares our experiences, empathizes with our struggles, and is always present with us is an encouragement and comfort. And no harms of belief outweigh these benefits. Therefore, it is optimal to believe God shares our experiences, empathizes with our struggles, and is always present with us.
I.11. It is not hard to believe God exists.
Some associate God with various claims that are dubious or incredible. But these other claims are merely ascribed to God by particular humans. There is nothing inherent in the concept of God that requires or even suggests them to be true (D.8.). Thus, doubting these claims has nothing to do with doubting God exists, and believing God exists has nothing to do with believing these other claims. In light of the above, it is not particularly hard to believe God exists (D.13., D.14.). And the benefits of belief are substantial (I.7., I.8., I.10.). Thus, difficulty does not prevent belief in God from being optimal (D.1.).
I.12. Pantheism is not optimal.
Pantheism proposes that the universe itself is God, and that He has no consciousness of His own distinct from the universe as a whole. This amounts to a semantic trick. It is simply renaming the universe God. And it foregoes all the advantages we have just demonstrated. So it cannot be an optimal belief (D.1.).
I.13. Belief in a limited God is not optimal.
Some hold that God is powerful enough to create our world, but too limited to make it perfect. Yet because creating a perfect world seems only minimally harder than creating a world as complex as ours, this implies His power must fall into an improbably narrow band. That is hard to credit (D.13., D.14.). Furthermore, belief in such a limited God offers fewer advantages than belief in a more powerful one (I.8.). As it is both harder to believe and less rewarding, it cannot qualify as optimal.
I.14. Polytheism is not optimal if understood literally.
Polytheism means belief in multiple gods. It can take four possible forms.
The first form of polytheism grants that the gods of myth are only imaginative representations of God's aspects. According to this formulation, imagining such gods is still a useful meditation technique, because it allows us to relate intuitively to a God who would otherwise be too vast. Whether true or false, this claim is irrelevant to our present topic. For it pertains to meditation technique, not to God as such.
The second form of polytheism proposes instead that specific gods are real, distinct, and independent. This formulation is not credible, because there is no non-arbitrary way to determine which gods are real and what their nature is (D.14.). Nor is there sufficient reason to believe multiple distinct gods exist in the first place.
The third form of polytheism holds that specific gods are real and distinct, but aspects of one multifarious God. This runs into a similar difficulty. Even if we suppose God has many or infinite aspects, it is impossible to delimit them into distinct personal identities without falling into arbitrariness (D.14.). And the supposition itself is dubious.
If we accept that divine identities are neither specific nor distinct but still insist on diversity, we arrive at a weaker fourth form of polytheism. It merely holds that God is inconstant, or at least values many things and sees creation from many angles, some of which are contradictory. But belief in an inconstant God is plainly less optimal than belief in a reliably loving God (I.10.). And the rest adds little to our existing picture. We have already said it is optimal to believe God knows and loves all His creatures (I.7., I.9.). Some of those creatures disagree with each other. One might call this polytheism in a metaphorical sense. But it is not polytheism in a literal one.
In sum, polytheism is not optimal if understood literally.
I.15. Atheism is not optimal.
Atheism is not doubt, but a competing belief. It can claim one advantage over theism. It encourages us to be self-reliant rather than wait for salvation to come from outside ourselves. However, the optimal account of creation already requires us to be self-reliant, because it asserts that we should expect no assistance from God within this world (I.3.). Thus, atheism offers no substantial advantages of its own, and lacks any of the numerous advantages for belief previously listed (D.1.).
I.16. Agnosticism is not optimal.
Agnosticism is non-belief. By establishing that some religious beliefs are good on net (I.10., I.8.), we have already shown it is not optimal.
I.17. Summary of optimal beliefs about God.
One and only one God exists (D.8., I.14.). He is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient (I.7.←D.14.; I.8.←I.3.+D.14.; I.9.←I.8.+D.14.). He created our world in order to generate creatures whose entelecheia and actions are not predetermined by Him (D.6., I.3.). For the same purpose, He follows a principle of non-interference that prevents Him from eliminating all evil (I.2.). Finally, God's understanding of the good is not identical to the human understanding of the good (I.4.←D.2.+I.3.). However, He shares our experiences and empathizes with our struggles nonetheless (I.10.←I.7.+I.9.).
II. Death
II.1. Survival of the spirit after death does not contradict science.
The fact that a spirit's (D.3.) consciousness disappears from the body upon death does not prove it never reappears elsewhere. The former is knowable, but the latter is unknowable (D.10.). By definition, science does not include beliefs about unknowables (D.11). So survival of the spirit after death does not contradict science.
II.2. The belief that the spirit is annihilated upon death increases some harms.
The belief that we and our loved ones are annihilated upon death causes us sorrow and despair. Sorrow and despair are harms (D.2.).
II.3. The belief that the spirit survives death reduces some harms.
If we do not believe we and our loved ones are annihilated upon death, we feel less sorrow and despair. Sorrow and despair are harms.
II.4. It is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be.
We feel happier when we can look forward to a better future. And the better that future, the happier we feel. So it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (D.1., D.2.).
II.5. It is optimal to believe death always has an expected cost sufficient to deter carelessness.
If we do not expect death to be costly, we will treat life carelessly instead of valuing it. Such carelessness entails large harms. For instance, murder, suicide, reckless endangerment, negligence, excessive risk-taking, and so forth (D.2.). Hence, it is optimal to believe death always has an expected cost sufficient to deter carelessness.
II.6. It is optimal to believe the spirit survives death.
Belief that the spirit survives death reduces some harms (II.3.). It only increases other harms by enabling carelessness. However, it is optimal to believe death has a cost sufficient to deter carelessness (II.5.). Such a cost prevents those other harms. By consequence, the belief that the spirit survives death produces a net benefit. Furthermore, the survival of the spirit after death does not contradict science (II.1.). So it is optimal to believe the spirit survives death (D.1.).
II.7. It is optimal to believe the cost for death is paid in the afterlife.
It is optimal to believe that death has a cost and that the spirit survives death (II.5., II.6.). The cost for death must be paid upon or after death rather than before it. Since the cost is not annihilation itself, it cannot be paid in the present life by the deceased. So it must be paid either in the present life by those left behind, or in the afterlife (D.5.). However, no cost paid in the present life by those left behind can apply to all deaths while conforming with knowns (D.9.). Hence, it is optimal to believe the cost for death is paid in the afterlife.
II.8. It is optimal to believe the cost for death is paid by the deceased.
The cost for deaths caused by natural evils cannot be justifiably paid by anyone but the deceased. And if the cost for deaths caused by other spirits were to be paid by those spirits and not by the deceased, perverse consequences would follow. For instance, murder would be an act of self-sacrificial compassion. Therefore, it is optimal to believe the cost for death is paid by the deceased.
II.9. It is optimal to believe death causes a loss of personal identity, a decrease in virtue, a decrease in happiness, or some combination of these in the afterlife.
The potential costs for death can be divided into three categories. A loss of personal identity, a decrease in virtue, or a decrease in happiness. We will refer to the last as a hedonic cost. Other costs are only relevant insofar as they bring about one of these three. It is optimal to believe the cost of death is paid in the afterlife (II.7.). Hence, it is optimal to believe death causes a loss of personal identity, a decrease in virtue, a decrease in happiness, or some combination of these in the afterlife.
II.10. Loss of virtue alone is neither an optimal nor a sufficient cost for death.
It is better to be wiser, more skillful, and more beautiful, regardless of happiness or identity (D.2.). Thus, the cost of death could take the form of an afterlife (D.5.) where we have fewer such virtues. Yet the prospect of an afterlife where we are less virtuous yet at least equally happy is both morally unpalatable and hard to credit (D.14.). Furthermore, it is not clear that such a cost could be sufficient to deter carelessness in all cases (II.5.). Therefore, loss of virtue alone is neither an optimal nor a sufficient cost for death.
II.11. Loss of personal identity is not a sufficient cost for death.
Personal identity is a good valued for its own sake (D.2.). Most would make considerable efforts to avoid losing their memory, character, and social connections even if they were assured equal happiness. Nevertheless, the cost of identity loss is not always sufficient to discourage carelessness. Some feel self-hatred, self-boredom, or self-disinterest. These reduce or nullify the cost. And the value of personal identity is limited regardless. If the afterlife is significantly better than the present, loss of personal identity may not suffice to deter carelessness (II.5.). And it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). So loss of personal identity is not a sufficient cost for death.
II.12. A decrease in happiness can be a sufficient cost for death.
A hedonic cost can easily scale to any value necessary. And we feel no intrinsic objection to this type of cost. Therefore, a decrease in happiness can be a sufficient cost for death.
II.13. Any variable hedonic cost for death must be proportional to lifespan, intention, or the completion of a set of tasks.
If a cost is variable and not arbitrary it must be a function of some relevant quantity. The only quantities sufficiently relevant to proportion a hedonic cost for death are lifespan, intention, and the completion of a set of tasks. By a set of tasks, we mean in the broadest sense things that must be done, such that a cost would be levied to the extent they are left incomplete (D.18.). It follows that any variable hedonic cost for death must be proportional to lifespan, intention, or the completion of a set of tasks.
II.14. A cost for death proportional to intention is not sufficient.
Intentions are not relevant to all aspects of carelessness. If natural or unnatural misfortunes cause a loss of life and the only cost for death is proportional to intention, then the victims would suffer no loss. Hence, a cost for death proportional to intention is not sufficient.
II.15. A cost for death proportional to lifespan is not optimal.
A cost for death in direct proportion to lifespan would encourage early carelessness. A cost in inverse proportion to lifespan would punish those who have the misfortune of dying young in the afterlife. Such punishment would be arbitrary and unjustifiable. Furthermore, it is not possible for a cost inversely proportional to lifespan to be just and non-arbitrary. For an inverse proportion requires a third magnitude. That is, y=n/x requires some numerator n against which x can be measured. However, all possible numerators either defeat the purpose or fall into arbitrariness (D.14.).
The numerator could be the longest possible lifespan for any being. But it would be arbitrary to measure all beings against this lifespan (D.14.). Or, it could be the longest possible lifespan for each specific individual. But disease and violence can be as inescapable as old age, and accounting for all unavoidable deaths would cancel out the intended cost (II.5.). Or, the numerator could be some other number specific to each individual that happens to equal the exact cost we require. But this only makes the arbitrariness stark.
Rewarding longer lifespans with a bonus instead of punishing shorter lifespans with a cost has the same faults. For it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). And if some people achieve the maximum possible happiness in the afterlife, adding a bonus for longer lifespans would either flatten the top of the distribution or force a rescaling of the whole distribution on the basis of the longest possible lifespan. The former would unacceptably distort whatever reward structure produces inequality in the afterlife. The latter is a de-facto cost for those who don't receive the maximum bonus, equivalent to the first numerator analyzed in the preceding paragraph.
Thus, a cost for death proportional to lifespan is not optimal.
II.16. An afterlife eternally less happy than the present is a sufficient but not optimal cost for death.
If we were to live on in an afterlife that is eternally less happy than the present, death would entail a cost sufficient to deter carelessness (II.5.). However, this amounts to a cost for death proportional to lifespan. And a cost for death proportional to lifespan is not optimal (II.15.). Furthermore, an afterlife eternally less happy than the present would be a harm well in excess of the necessary deterrent (D.2.). And it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). Thus, an afterlife eternally less happy than the present is a sufficient but not optimal cost for death.
II.17. If we live only one mortal life, a fixed hedonic cost for death is neither optimal nor sufficient.
If we live only one mortal life and then enter the afterlife, no fixed hedonic cost for death can have a marginal cost. Since all mortals die, all mortals would pay the same regardless. Any penalty that has zero marginal cost would make the afterlife worse without discouraging carelessness (II.5.). Therefore, if we live only one mortal life, a fixed hedonic cost for death is neither optimal nor sufficient.
II.18. If we live numerous mortal lives, a fixed hedonic cost for death is sufficient but not optimal.
If we live and die multiple times, a fixed cost for each death would apply more often when our lives are shorter, yielding a positive marginal cost. But the variation in frequency makes the sum of costs inversely proportional to the sum of lifespans following a reciprocal function y=k/x, where x is the mean lifespan and k is some arbitrary constant (D.14.). And a cost for death that is proportional to lifespan is not optimal (II.15.). Thus, if we live numerous mortal lives, a fixed hedonic cost for death is sufficient but not optimal.
II.19. A variable hedonic cost for death relative to task completion can always be sufficient.
It is possible to assign tasks of any number and type (D.18.). And a hedonic cost for death can scale in any proportion to their incompletion upon death (II.12.). This flexibility ensures it is always possible to base a sufficient cost for death on task completion. Furthermore, tasks can be meaningful and non-arbitrary. Therefore, a variable hedonic cost for death relative to task completion can always be sufficient.
II.20. It is optimal to believe there is a variable hedonic cost for death relative to task completion.
It is optimal to believe death causes a loss of personal identity, a decrease in virtue, a decrease in happiness, or some combination of these (II.9.). Furthermore, any hedonic cost for death must be either fixed, or proportional to lifespan, intention, or task completion (II.13.).
Neither loss of identity nor loss of virtue are sufficient costs (II.5., II.10., II.11.). Nor is combining the two sufficient. Fixed hedonic costs are not optimal (II.17., II.18.), variable hedonic costs proportional to intention are not sufficient (II.14.), and variable hedonic costs proportional to lifespan are not optimal (II.15.). However, a variable hedonic cost relative to task completion can always be a sufficient cost for death (II.19.). Through process of elimination, it is therefore optimal to believe there is a variable hedonic cost for death relative to task completion.
II.21. It is optimal to believe we must complete a set of tasks during life.
It is optimal to believe there is a variable hedonic cost for death proportional to task completion (II.20.). Such a cost plainly presupposes tasks (D.18.). Therefore, it is optimal to believe we must complete a set of tasks during life.
II.22. Summary of optimal beliefs regarding death and the survival of the spirit.
The spirit lives on after death (II.6.←II.1.+II.3.+D.1.). The afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.←D.1.+D.5.). We must complete a set of tasks during life (II.21.←II.20.). And there is a cost for death proportional to tasks left incomplete (II.20.←II.5.+II.9.+II.10.+II.11.+II.13.+II.14.+II.15.+II.17.+II.18.+II.19.). We will deduce the nature of these tasks in later propositions.
III. Lives
III.1. It is optimal to believe we can live multiple lives.
God's intention is to develop (D.7.) entities without determining their entelecheia (D.6.) or actions (I.3.). If we each lived only once, many of us would lack the opportunity to develop meaningfully. For instance, those who die in infancy. This would contradict God's intention and undermine the solution to the problem of evil (I.3., I.6.). But if we can live multiple lives no such difficulty arises, since development cut short in one life can continue in another. Hence, it is optimal to believe we can live multiple lives.
The usual attempt is to propose purgatories or limbos that are constructed to either enable spirits to complete their development, or else acceptably manage their lack of opportunity to complete it. Because it falls short of heaven, limbo amounts to an eternal punishment for spirits who were merely unlucky due to transient external factors. This is morally repugnant (D.2.). And purgatory amounts to a second life that is organized as a curated trial. This breaks the solution to the problem of evil (I.3., I.6.). For if a curated trial sufficed to develop spirits, it would be more efficient to place every spirit in a curated trial from the start. And that would render our present world redundant (D.13.). It would also diminish the value of our lives here.
To justify God's creation of our realm, there must be a developmental requirement that can only be fulfilled within it (D.13., I.3.). And a requirement must be fulfilled completely or it is not a true requirement at all. While one could claim stillborn infants have already fulfilled this developmental requirement, few would find such a claim credible (D.14.). By allowing development to be completed over additional lives in this realm rather than in a curated purgatory, one solves the entire problem neatly and parsimoniously (D.13.).
Conceptual coherence and credibility are more important than raw simplicity (D.13.). So however tempting it might be, insisting on one life only is an error.
III.2. It is optimal to believe spirits exist.
A spirit is a persistent non-physical entity capable of consciousness (D.3.). The death of the body entails the destruction of the physical correlates of consciousness. To survive it, some non-physical entity must persist to be conscious again elsewhere. The spirit is the minimal necessary definition of such an entity. And it is optimal to believe we survive death (II.6.). Therefore, it is optimal to believe spirits exist.
III.3. A spirit is not necessarily information in the world.
A spirit is a persistent entity capable of consciousness, and consciousness has physical correlates in our world. But the spirit is not itself consciousness. Nor is it physical (D.3.). So it does not need to be observable in the world it is conscious of. Thus, a spirit is not necessarily information in the world.
III.4. In the lower realm no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by non-physical means.
All worlds in the lower realm are causally closed, and all information in them has physical correlates whose behavior is dictated by physical laws (D.20.). Thus, in the lower realm no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by non-physical means.
III.5. In the lower realm it is impossible to know which life a given spirit is reborn into.
A spirit's different lives are not linked together by physical laws. So any observable link between them would constitute information that does not follow physical laws. And by definition, such information cannot exist in the lower realm (D.20.). Therefore, in the lower realm it is impossible to know which life a given spirit is reborn into.
III.6. In the lower realm effectively no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by any means.
In the lower realm no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by non-physical means (III.4.). A physical record might nevertheless preserve information from a spirit's former life and transfer it to a new life. But it is impossible to know into which life a given spirit is reborn, and the total number of lives is large. So even if a physical record were transferred between a spirit's different lives by extraordinary luck, it would be both impossible to recognize this and absurd to guess it. By consequence, in the lower realm effectively no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by any means.
III.7. Our world is almost certainly in the lower realm.
Which realm our world is in is an empirical question (D.11.). Current empirical knowns strongly suggest that in our world all information has physical correlates whose behavior follows physical laws, causal closure is complete, and all entities are mutually dependent (D.9.). Nevertheless, these points cannot be established with absolute certainty. Therefore, our world is almost certainly in the lower realm. In the remainder of the text we will assume this to be the case without bothering to repeat it.
III.8. Meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives can be assured without violating causal closure or contradicting physical laws.
A spirit is not physical (D.3.). And it is not necessarily information in the world (III.3.). So it can transfer from a life that is ending to a life that is beginning without violating causal closure or contradicting physical laws.
A spirit's identity will persist to a meaningful degree if it is reborn into lives that instantiate meaningfully related personal characteristics or narratives. Consider by analogy a screen. It displays information from a source to which it is connected. If it is connected to a different source of similar information, it will display similar information. This similarity does not require that the screen transfer any information between sources.
The quantity and variety of lives produced through natural causation is sufficient to provide meaningfully continuous destinations for every spirit. Thus, meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives can be assured without violating causal closure or contradicting physical laws.
III.9. It is optimal to believe there is meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives.
Meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives can be assured without violating causal closure or contradicting physical laws (III.8.). Hence, it does not contradict knowns. And a hedonic cost relative to task completion can already be sufficient to deter carelessness (II.19.). So total loss of identity is not a necessary cost. Since it is optimal to believe the afterlife (D.5.) is as good as it can be, we should not suppose unnecessary losses (II.4.). And the benefits of belief are greater than the cost (D.14.). Therefore, it is optimal to believe there is meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives (D.1.).
III.10. It is optimal to believe God addresses all spirits to the rebirth lives that best facilitate development and continuity of identity.
It is optimal to believe God intends to develop spirits (D.3.) without predetermining their entelecheia (D.6.) or actions (I.3.). It is also optimal to believe there is meaningful continuity of identity between a spirit's lives (III.9.).
Due to the vastness of creation and the need to address all spirits within it to lives that best satisfy the above criteria (I.3., III.9.), individual spirits can never know enough to choose the optimal lives for rebirth. Nor can any process resembling a natural law or mechanistic rule address them appropriately. Therefore, they can only be so addressed by the judgment of a divinity (D.8.) or a process so closely resembling the judgment of a divinity that it would be incredible to call it anything else (D.14.).
Thus, it is optimal to believe God addresses all spirits to the rebirth lives that best facilitate development and continuity of identity.
III.11. It is optimal to believe we suffer partial identity loss each time we are reborn in the lower realm.
In the lower realm no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by non-physical means (III.4.). But without such transfer, it is impossible for particular memories or learned habits to persist uninterrupted between lives. For these are encoded in the body that is destroyed upon death (D.9.). And particular memories and learned habits make up important components of identity.
Furthermore, if we were to live a succession of lives so similar that nearly identical memories were restored, our experiences would be redundant. This would cause us to overfit on local circumstances and limit our opportunity to develop (D.7.). That would frustrate God's intention in creation (I.3.). And it is a needlessly discouraging prospect besides (D.1.). It would be especially damaging for those trapped by recursive loops in their own current identity. Therefore, it is optimal to believe we suffer partial identity loss each time we are reborn in the lower realm.
III.12. An obligation to complete tasks in the lower realm after death entails partial identity loss.
If we are obliged to complete tasks (D.18.) in the lower realm after death, then we must be reborn in the lower realm. And it is optimal to believe we suffer partial identity loss each time we are reborn in the lower realm (III.11.). Therefore, an obligation to complete tasks in the lower realm after death entails partial identity loss.
III.13. It is optimal to believe the spirit must attain a satisfactory level of development in the lower realm before ascending.
Parsimony dictates that the lower realm must exist for some purpose that can be accomplished there and nowhere else (D.13.). Without such a purpose it would be redundant. A developmental opportunity that requires both causal closure and non-interference is the most credible explanation (D.20.). Furthermore, the belief that we must attain a satisfactory level of development in the lower realm before ascending benefits us by giving meaning and focus to our struggles here. Therefore, it is optimal to believe the spirit must attain a satisfactory level of development in the lower realm before ascending.
III.14. It is optimal to believe we each co-decide with God when we have achieved a satisfactory level of development to ascend.
Only God or the individual spirit could credibly decide whether development is satisfactory. But the spirit's limited knowledge constrains his ability to decide perfectly. And if God were to decide, He would compromise His intention to develop entities without determining their entelecheia (D.6.) or actions (I.3.). These faults can only be avoided if both God and the individual spirit decide together. Therefore, it is optimal to believe we each co-decide with God when we have achieved a satisfactory level of development to ascend.
III.15. It is optimal to believe we eventually ascend to the upper realm.
It is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). But the order of the lower realm limits the quality and kind of lives within it (D.20.). We can easily conceive of a non-contradictory realm that lacks these limitations and therefore permits maximally good lives. We will call this the upper realm (D.21.). Therefore, it is optimal to believe we eventually ascend to the upper realm.
III.16. It is optimal to believe we must complete our development before we ascend to the upper realm.
God's intention is to develop spirits without predetermining their entelecheia or actions (I.3.). But God curates the upper realm such that free development can no longer occur there (D.21.). Nor do entities there conflict in a way that compels it. So if God's intention is to be satisfied, development (D.7.) must be complete before arrival. It follows that it is optimal to believe we must complete our development before we ascend to the upper realm.
III.17. Summary of optimal beliefs regarding lives.
We live a sequence of lives with a partially continuous identity (III.9.←III.8.+II.4.; III.11.←III.4.). Our rebirth lives are selected by God to facilitate our development (III.10.←I.3.+III.9.). After we attain a satisfactory level of development we ascend (III.13., II.4.). We eventually arrive in the upper realm (III.15.←II.4.).
IV. Tasks
IV.1. It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are the best we could undertake.
It is optimal to believe we must complete a set of tasks during life (II.21.). The belief that the tasks we must complete are the best we could undertake is encouraging and gives meaning to our struggles. There would be no advantage to believing them worse than they could be. Nor is there any need to do so. Therefore, it is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are the best we could undertake.
IV.2. It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are those that do the most good.
It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are the best we could undertake (IV.1.). And the best tasks we could undertake are those that do the most good. Therefore, it is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are those that do the most good.
IV.3. It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete best advance our development.
It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are those that do the most good (IV.2.). While we can conceive of cases where doing the most good would not best advance our development, it is both plausible and better to believe our tasks accomplish both at once.
It is plausible to believe our tasks accomplish both at once because we observe in general that development advances while trying to accomplish other goals. Furthermore, learning how to do the most good is itself a kind of development, and trying to accomplish tasks that do the most good is the surest way to advance it. And it is better to believe our tasks accomplish both at once because God's intention in creating our world is to develop entities without predetermining their entelecheia or actions (I.3.). The best possible tasks would at once serve God's intention and accomplish the most good.
The belief that the tasks we must complete best advance our development is plausible, credible, and better than the alternative. It is therefore optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are those that best advance our development.
IV.4. It is optimal to believe our tasks are never punitive in primary intent.
It is optimal to believe our tasks best facilitate our development (IV.3.). Tasks of this sort can at worst be incidentally punitive. For if they were punitive in primary intent, they would not have been chosen to best facilitate our development. Therefore, it is optimal to believe our tasks are never punitive in primary intent.
IV.5. It is optimal to believe the nature of tasks varies greatly depending on the spirit and circumstances.
It is optimal to believe the tasks we must complete are the best we could undertake, and that they facilitate our development (IV.1., IV.3.). Because spirits vary, the best tasks and the path of development must vary too. For instance, passing an idle morning watching clouds and climbing a high mountain can be equally valid tasks for different spirits at different times. Hence, it is optimal to believe the nature of tasks varies greatly depending on the spirit and circumstances.
IV.6. It is optimal to believe doing the maximum net good in our present life also makes the best progress toward the completion of our tasks.
We have no way to determine our specific tasks in the present life. However, since the optimal beliefs about unknowables are those that achieve the maximum net good in this life (D.1.), and the tasks we must complete are those that do the most good (IV.2.), the optimal means to complete our tasks follows tautologically. Thus, it is optimal to believe doing the maximum net good in our present life also makes the best progress toward the completion of our tasks.
IV.7. It is optimal to believe we co-select our tasks with God.
Only God or the spirit charged to complete them could credibly select tasks. But if God were to select tasks, He would compromise His intention to develop entities without determining their actions (I.3.). And the spirit's limited knowledge constrains his ability to select the most appropriate tasks. These faults can only be avoided if both God and the spirit participate in task selection. Therefore, it is optimal to believe we co-select our tasks with God.
IV.8. The obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or undertake substitute tasks in a higher realm is not an optimal cost for death.
It is optimal to believe the spirit must attain a satisfactory level of development in the lower realm before ascending (III.13.). And development can be unsatisfactory upon death. So the cost of death cannot require immediately subsequent task completion in any world outside the lower realm. A delayed cost would be unparsimonious, discounted for psychological reasons, and offer no justifying benefits. Hence, the obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or undertake substitute tasks in a higher realm is not an optimal cost for death.
IV.9. The obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or undertake appropriate substitute tasks of equal or greater difficulty in the same realm is a sufficient cost for death.
An obligation to complete tasks in the same realm after death delays ascent to a higher realm. That is already a cost. And it is compounded in the lower realm. For here any knowledge and learned skills needed for task completion must be rebuilt upon rebirth, attending struggles must be repeated, and identity must be partially lost (III.12.). Unless substitute tasks are much easier than the tasks they replace, these costs are sufficient to deter carelessness. Therefore, the obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or undertake appropriate substitute tasks of equal or greater difficulty in the same realm is a sufficient cost for death.
IV.10. It is optimal to believe a cost for failure to complete tasks is the obligation to repeat the incomplete tasks or undertake appropriate substitute tasks of equal or greater difficulty in the same realm.
It is optimal to believe there is a hedonic cost for death relative to task completion (II.20.). This must take one of three forms. First, straightforward pain. Second, the obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or appropriate substitute tasks. And third, some other experience. The first form does not have any intrinsically compelling justification. Nor would it meaningfully effectuate God's intention to develop entities (I.3.). The second does have and would, for tasks are selected to facilitate the spirit's development (IV.3.). The third form is unparsimonious, and offers no benefit exceeding the second.
The obligation to repeat incomplete tasks or undertake substitute tasks in a higher realm is not an optimal cost for death (IV.8.). But in the same realm such an obligation is sufficient provided substitute tasks are of equal or greater difficulty (IV.9.). Hence, it is optimal to believe a cost for failure to complete tasks is the obligation to repeat the incomplete tasks or undertake appropriate substitute tasks of equal or greater difficulty in the same realm.
IV.11. It is optimal to believe our current tasks are completable.
It is optimal to believe we eventually ascend to the upper realm (III.15.). But the cost for failure to complete tasks is repetition of incomplete tasks in the same realm (IV.10.). For both to be possible, tasks in the lower realm must be completable. Therefore, it is optimal to believe our current tasks are completable.
IV.12. It is not optimal to believe all circumstances present us with genuine tasks.
The lower realm consists of free entities sometimes at cross-purposes (I.3.). We have no reason to assume such circumstances must always present us with genuine tasks. And such an assumption would force us to interpret even the most pointless circumstances as productive. This would push us to endure torments for no purpose at all. That is a harm without a benefit. Thus, it is not optimal to believe all circumstances present us with genuine tasks.
IV.13. It is optimal to believe we cannot precisely estimate the lives or time required to complete all our tasks.
It is optimal to believe we are given tasks that do good and advance our development (IV.2., IV.3.). Yet we cannot know our specific tasks, our success rate at completing them, or the endpoint of our development. In the face of these unknowables, there is no non-arbitrary way to determine a precise time or number of lives within which our tasks will be completed. Therefore, it is optimal to believe we cannot precisely estimate the lives or time required to complete all our tasks.
IV.14. It is optimal to believe our set of tasks requires at least several lives to complete.
It is optimal to believe there is a variable hedonic cost for death relative to task completion (II.20.). A rational agent will discount this cost in direct proportion to his confidence the tasks are already complete. And as he cannot know his exact tasks or whether he has yet completed them (IV.13.), his confidence that they are already complete will be inversely proportional to the time he expects them to require.
There are two ways to ensure this cost remains sufficient to deter carelessness despite discounting. First, it could be so high that no plausible discounting renders it insufficient. This would be achieved by penalizing incompletion with much more unpleasant tasks. Second, the cost could be modest but the set of tasks on whose basis it is levied could require multiple lives to complete. This long expected duration would lower the maximum discount to a negligible level.
The first way would entail high variance. The cost of death would be distributed unpredictably and fall lightly on some and heavily on others. This would ensure arbitrary and unfair outcomes. It would also require punitive task assignments. None of this is optimal (IV.4.).
The second way smooths outcomes and avoids these faults. The more lives, the lower the cost need be. However, several is already enough to reduce the maximum discount to a small fraction. For instance, if the exit probability per life is fixed, the chance that any given life is the last can be estimated at less than one in ten if the median number of lives (that is, the half-life) is seven. Given the high expected cost of incompletion (IV.9.), such a small maximum discount is already enough to ensure discounting will have a negligible impact on the calculations of a rational agent.
This second way is plainly better than the first. Therefore, it is optimal to believe our set of tasks requires at least several lives to complete.
IV.15. It is optimal to believe any given life is unlikely to be the last in this realm.
It is optimal to believe a cost for failure to complete tasks is the obligation to repeat the incomplete tasks or undertake appropriate substitute tasks of equal or greater difficulty in the same realm (IV.10.). And it is optimal to believe our tasks require several lives to complete (IV.14.). Furthermore, we cannot know the ordinal number of the present life nor the precise number of total lives (IV.13.). This implies that we should always expect to live further lives in the same realm. By consequence, it is optimal to believe any given life is unlikely to be the last in this realm.
IV.16. It is optimal to believe the time required to ascend is as short as possible when all things are considered.
The effect size of any fractional period of time is inversely proportional to total time unless that fractional period is privileged. Assuming our present life to be a privileged period within our total time in the lower realm would be arbitrary (D.14.). But the belief that our present life is impactful benefits us by increasing our motivation to live the best we can. It follows that a shorter total time is better.
Furthermore, it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). This implies any delay in ascending to a maximally good realm after death must be as brief as it can be when all things are considered. Finally, we discount the future. So a faster ascent encourages a happier outlook than a slower one.
For these reasons, it is optimal to believe the time required to ascend is as short as possible when all things are considered.
IV.17. It is easiest to believe the number of lives required for satisfactory development in the lower realm is more than several, but less than multitudes.
It is difficult to believe a spirit's development in the lower realm could be completed in just a few lives. For lives in the lower realm offer limited opportunities and are subject to high noise (I.3.). Experience informs us that learning anything substantial takes more than a few trials, and usually more than several.
At the same time, it is difficult to believe a spirit's development would necessitate an extraordinary number of lives in the lower realm. Because information cannot transfer between lives there, the maximum possible development that can be accomplished is limited (III.6.). Adding more and more lives cannot erase this limit. And it might lead to overfitting on quirks specific to the lower realm.
Thus, it is easiest to believe the number of lives required for satisfactory development in the lower realm is more than several, but less than multitudes.
IV.18. It is optimal to believe the number of lives required to ascend from the lower realm is modest.
It is optimal to believe the time required to ascend is as short as possible when all things are considered (IV.16.). Let us now consider all things.
It is optimal to believe that tasks require at least several lives to complete (IV.14.), that the spirit must attain a satisfactory level of development in the lower realm before ascending (III.13.), and that we cannot know precisely how long this will take (IV.13.). And it is easiest to believe the number of lives required for satisfactory development in the lower realm is more than several, but less than multitudes (IV.17.).
Considering all this, the fastest ascent possible would require somewhat more than several lives. We might loosely estimate this as a number in the low double digits. But to avoid any suggestion of precision, we will simply characterize it as modest. Thus, it is optimal to believe the number of lives required to ascend from the lower realm is modest.
Precisely because they are so discouraging, ad hoc solutions such as prapatti are called in to make them palatable. But these break the solution to the problem of evil by collapsing the divinely intended process of indeterminate development with an arbitrary emergency exit. That is incoherent. Nor is it credible even in the non-theistic format of nembutsu recitation. The preceding propositions demonstrate why it is optimal to believe we can ascend in a modest number of lives. And this belief removes the psychological compulsion to break systematic coherence.
IV.19. It is optimal to believe we enjoy a limited period of rest between lives.
It is optimal to believe we spend more than several lives in the lower realm (IV.18.). When lives and tasks are difficult, the prospect of more than several in uninterrupted sequence is discouraging. The promise of a rest period between each life can soothe this distress without contradicting or distorting the developmental logic (I.3.). Yet if the rest period were unlimited, it would be a final endpoint rather than a period of rest. Therefore, it is optimal to believe we enjoy a limited period of rest between lives.
IV.20. Summary of optimal beliefs regarding tasks.
We complete certain tasks during life to develop (IV.3.). We co-select these tasks with God (IV.7.). When we die without having achieved a satisfactory level of development, we must be reborn in the same realm and attempt these or similar tasks again (IV.10.). It is possible to complete our development and ascend to a higher realm in a modest number of lives, but not less (IV.18.).
V. Realms
V.1. The problem of integration.
In the lower realm effectively no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by any means (III.6.). And if effectively no information can transfer, it is impossible for a spirit to develop across lives. In other words, if each life's learning is siloed from the next, they cannot compound.
This appears to imply one of three scenarios. Either there is no developmental progress across lives, so the lower realm is a waiting room whence ascent to a higher realm occurs at some arbitrary point or not at all. Or each life is an isolated attempt to reach a developmental target through luck, so some or most are failed rolls leaving no impression on the future. Or development only happens at the physical level and on an evolutionary time scale, so individual lives have negligible impact. All three scenarios are very discouraging.
We will call this the problem of integration. To solve it we must find a set of credible beliefs that allows the spirit to develop by integrating information from different lives. By integration we mean collecting, processing, and compressing information into a more comprehensive state.
V.2. The problem of integration can only be solved outside the lower and upper realms.
To solve the problem of integration we must identify some set of credible beliefs that allows the spirit to develop by integrating information from different lives (V.1.). In the lower realm effectively no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives (III.6.). A fortiori, information cannot be integrated there. As the upper realm is not obliged to follow natural causation, it is possible for information to transfer between lives there (D.21.). However, integration is part of the development process. And it is optimal to believe the spirit does not ascend to the upper realm until his development is complete (III.16.). Hence, the problem of integration can only be solved outside the lower and upper realms.
V.3. Task selection and development evaluation must occur outside the lower and upper realms.
It is optimal to believe we co-select our tasks and co-evaluate our development (IV.7., III.14.). We observably do not do this in the lower realm. And we cannot do it in a higher realm. For we cannot ascend until development is satisfactory (III.13.), and we cannot determine development is satisfactory until we evaluate it (III.14.). Thus, task selection and development evaluation must occur outside the lower and upper realms.
V.4. A period of rest between lives can only occur outside the lower and upper realms.
A period of rest between lives cannot occur within lives in the lower realm. And a spirit cannot ascend to a higher realm until his development is satisfactory (III.13.). Therefore, any period of rest between lives can only occur outside the lower and upper realms.
V.5. The liminal realm is the most appropriate environment for solving the problem of integration and enabling task selection, development evaluation, and rest between lives.
Task selection, development evaluation, rest between lives, and a solution to the problem of integration can only occur outside the lower and upper realms (V.2., V.3., V.4.). So if these are to occur at all, one or more other realms must exist.
Parsimony dictates we should suppose the fewest realms that accomplish the necessary (D.13.). So if possible, we should suppose the existence of a single additional realm that simultaneously provides an appropriate environment for integration, selection, evaluation, and rest. An environment of this sort would permit one to reflect on information from past lives at leisure and for a limited time without troubling interference from noise and new problems. We are confronted with noise and new problems when our experience depends on other entities that are imperfectly predictable or imperfectly aligned with our aims. So in the most appropriate environment such external dependencies would not exist.
We will call this temporary realm where we reflect on information from past lives at leisure and have no external dependencies the liminal realm (D.23.). Thus, the liminal realm is the most appropriate environment for solving the problem of integration and enabling task selection, development evaluation, and rest between lives.
V.6. It is optimal to believe we visit the liminal realm between lives and there integrate information from our past lives, evaluate our development, select new tasks, and rest.
The cost of belief in the liminal realm is substantial. It requires us to give credence to an additional and unfamiliar location in the afterlife. However, it solves several significant problems in one blow (V.5.). These benefits are large enough to outweigh the cost. And because the liminal realm is the most appropriate environment for the solutions, no alternative belief can do so as well (V.5.). Thus, it is optimal to believe we visit the liminal realm between lives and there integrate information from our past lives, evaluate our development, select new tasks, and rest.
V.7. It is optimal to believe a limited number of spirits can communicate to a limited degree in the liminal realm.
It would be simplest to understand the liminal realm as one where we are completely isolated from anything but information drawn from our past lives. However, such an understanding would have two significant drawbacks.
First, we perceive long periods of social isolation as a substantial hedonic cost. If the liminal realm imposed such a hedonic cost it would be a prison. Yet it is optimal to believe it provides a period of rest and is suitable for reflective learning (V.6.). Painful imprisonment would contradict this function. Second, both general experience and empirical knowns from machine learning indicate that limited communication with other learners can make learning more efficient. Thus, complete isolation might reduce learning efficiency. Notwithstanding the above, crowds interrupt rest, distract from reflection, and encourage convergence on mediocre solutions. So if the liminal realm is to fulfill its function efficiently it cannot enable excessive interaction.
On net the benefits of allowing limited communication with other spirits outweigh the simplicity of complete isolation. By consequence, it is optimal to believe a limited number of spirits can communicate to a limited degree in the liminal realm.
V.8. To learn completely, one must refine information gleaned from non-interactive study by applying it to new problem sets.
Experience informs us that studying large existing batches of sophisticated information in isolation is not sufficient to complete the learning process. It must be followed by application to new problems. This can be observed in most if not all domains of learning. For instance, one cannot master chess simply by studying games already played. One must also apply that learning by playing new games.
Empirical knowns confirm this principle does not apply to human learning alone. Machine learning uses an initial batch of offline training sets to prevent the model from being trapped on a local maximum. The model varies this data in an imagined world, then completes learning by tackling new problems. The final stage is necessary to perfect the model.
So to learn completely, one must refine information gleaned from non-interactive study by applying it to new problem sets.
V.9. We cannot complete our development in the lower realm, the liminal realm, or the upper realm.
To learn completely, one must refine information gleaned from non-interactive study by applying it to new problem sets (V.8.). However, in the lower realm effectively no information can transfer between a spirit's different lives by any means (III.6.). As a result, information integrated in the liminal realm cannot be applied to new problems in the lower realm. It follows that we cannot complete our development there.
Nor can integrated information be applied to new problems in the liminal realm. For by nature the liminal realm does not present us with new problems (D.23.). And it is optimal to believe we must complete our development before we ascend to the upper realm (III.16.). So we cannot complete our development in the liminal or upper realm either.
Hence, we cannot complete our development in the lower realm, the liminal realm, or the upper realm.
V.10. The middle realm is the most appropriate environment for applying integrated information, refining it, and completing development.
We cannot complete our development in the lower realm, the liminal realm, or the upper realm (V.9.). But it is optimal to believe we eventually complete our development (III.15., III.16.). This implies the existence of some fourth realm.
Nevertheless, this fourth realm cannot be much different from the lower realm. For if it differed greatly from the lower realm, the problems encountered in it would differ greatly as well. And that would render information gleaned from lives in the lower realm misleading and pointless. That is plainly not optimal. And it would defeat the realm's purpose.
So the most appropriate realm for completing development must be largely similar to the lower realm, but causally open at least in part to information from the liminal realm and past lives. We will call this realm the middle realm (D.22.).
V.11. It is optimal to believe we are reborn in the middle realm after our development in the lower realm has reached a satisfactory level.
It is optimal to believe we must attain a satisfactory level of development to ascend from the lower realm (III.13.). However, it is also optimal to believe we must complete our development before we ascend to the upper realm (III.16.). And development cannot be complete before the information integrated in the liminal realm has been applied and refined in some additional realm (V.9.). The middle realm is the most appropriate such realm (V.10.).
Because the middle realm is largely similar to the lower realm (V.10.), it is not particularly difficult to believe in its existence. And without its existence we could not complete our development (V.9.). Thus, it is optimal to believe we are reborn in the middle realm after our development in the lower realm has attained a satisfactory level.
V.12. It is optimal to believe a spirit's development in the middle realm reaches a peak in a finite time.
The middle realm gives a spirit at least partial access to integrated information from his past lives (V.10.). Because the middle realm allows him to apply and refine it, the quality of this information should improve with each life there. And as the quality of information improves, a spirit will become more able to identify and situate himself in his preferred environment. By consequence, the range of environments to which he is exposed will narrow over time unless it is forced wider by increasingly inclement circumstances. However, if a spirit's circumstances became more inclement with each life, his afterlife would be equal to or progressively worse than his present life. That would be unnecessarily discouraging. And it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.).
Any intelligence within a system is a subset of that system, and therefore has a limited capacity in comparison to the system as a whole. And because the consequences of his own development progressively narrow the environments in which he lives, any spirit with a limited capacity for information will eventually overwrite information from the inclement environments to which he was exposed in the lower realm in order to improve his performance in the narrower environments in which he is now able to situate himself. This will eventually lead to a loss of generality that amounts to regression rather than development. Hence, it is optimal to believe a spirit's development in the middle realm reaches a peak in a finite time.
V.13. It is optimal to believe we can ascend from the middle to the upper realm in a modest amount of time.
It is optimal to believe a spirit's development in the middle realm reaches a peak in a finite time (V.12.). While the number of unknowns make it impossible to calculate how long it would take for the loss of generality to outweigh the gain from refinement, it is not implausible that this time would be modest. Furthermore, it is optimal to believe we ascend to the upper realm in the shortest time possible when all things are equal (IV.16.). Thus, it is optimal to believe we can ascend from the middle to the upper realm in a modest amount of time.
V.14. It is optimal to believe a spirit's fundamental entelecheia is fixed upon his entry to the upper realm.
If development of his fundamental characteristics continued in the upper realm, a spirit would eventually overwrite information from the inclement environments to which he was exposed in the lower and middle realms. To avoid this loss while enjoying a maximally good environment, any fundamental characteristics at risk of loss must be fixed upon his arrival. And the upper realm is maximally good by definition (D.21.). Thus, it is optimal to believe a spirit's fundamental entelecheia is fixed upon his entry to the upper realm.
V.15. It is optimal to believe the upper realm is not boring or static.
The upper realm is by definition maximally good (D.21.). If it were boring or static, it would not be maximally good. To be maximally good the upper realm must offer spirits the maximally good amount of variety and change. And this can be done without altering a spirit's fundamental entelecheia. Thus, it is optimal to believe the upper realm is not boring or static.
V.16. It is optimal to believe worlds in the upper realm are maximally good for all spirits within them.
Worlds in the upper realm are by definition maximally good (D.21.). A world that is good for some spirits but not others necessarily falls short of the maximum good. Therefore, it is optimal to believe worlds in the upper realm are maximally good for all spirits within them.
V.17. Summary of optimal beliefs regarding realms.
There are four realms that facilitate the four stages of the development process. We begin our development in the lower realm, which is closed, chaotic, and undetermined (I.3.). We reflect on our lives there in the liminal realm without transferring the results of our reflection back to the lower realm (V.6.). Once we have gathered enough information from these siloed lives, we ascend to the middle realm (V.11.). In the middle realm we experience similar challenges, but can draw at least in part on the learning we have gleaned from our past lives (V.10.). Eventually we reach a point where our increasing refinement is counterbalanced by a loss of generality (V.12.). Our development is then complete, and we ascend to the upper realm, where our fundamental entelecheia is fixed on arrival (V.14.). Nevertheless, in the next chapter we will see that this ascent is contingent on fulfilling an additional qualification.
These simpler cosmologies fail precisely because they attempt to execute the functions of the liminal or middle realms in the present world. And those functions cannot be executed in the present world without contradicting causal closure and physical laws. But causal closure and physical laws are known features of our present world. Religious beliefs by definition cannot contradict knowns.
When the same functions are executed in separate realms instead, the contradiction disappears. So despite their novelty and complexity, the realms we propose are not an optional fantasy. Four and exactly four realms are forced by reason itself.
VI. Laws
VI.1. It is not optimal to believe we live in a simulation, illusion, or dream.
Whether we live in a simulation is unknowable. But there are no compelling reasons to believe we do. And it is less credible than the belief that our world is real. Of the multitude of possible explanations for the present world, it ranks among the least optimal. For if the present world were a simulation, then what happens in it would be less real than we perceive it to be. And if it were less real than we perceive it to be, then it would be less meaningful than we perceive it to be. The value of learning, insights, and emotions derived from it would be less. The stakes of difficult decisions and moral behavior would be lower.
Devaluing life here in this way does us harm. For life here is what we have, and if we perceive it to be worth less we will feel impoverished while living. If one were to insist the simulation hypothesis does not devalue the present world in any of these ways, one would only deprive it of meaning and relevance. And the cost of holding meaningless or irrelevant beliefs is greater than the benefit.
All of the above also applies to the belief that we live in an illusion or dream. These beliefs offer fewer benefits, do more harms, and are less credible than the belief that our world is real. Thus, it is not optimal to believe we live in a simulation, illusion, or dream.
VI.2. It is optimal to believe all entities capable of being conscious are conscious.
Whether every entity capable of consciousness does in fact have consciousness is unknowable. For consciousness as such is not observable as information in the world. However, if we were to doubt this we would be obliged to discount our moral duty to the extent of the doubt. For where there is no consciousness, there is no obligation of care.
To discount our obligation of care on the assumption that those who appear to be suffering have a probability of being conscious significantly below unity would undermine every type of moral calculus and contradict our basic sense of the good. Nor is there any compelling reason to believe it is the case. It is therefore optimal to believe all entities capable of being conscious are conscious.
VI.3. It is optimal to believe the externally inferred experience of conscious entities is a meaningful indicator of their conscious experience.
If the externally inferred experience of conscious entities had no connection to their conscious experience then those who appear to be suffering might be happy and those who appear to be happy might be suffering. This would make our moral duties and relationships with others nonsense, undermine every type of moral calculus, and contradict our basic sense of the good. And the claim itself is extravagant. Therefore, it is optimal to believe the externally inferred experience of conscious entities is a meaningful indicator of their conscious experience.
VI.4. It is optimal to believe all conscious entities have spirits.
It would be arbitrary and unjustifiable to suppose that some conscious entities have spirits while others don't. There is no reason to believe this is the case. Nor is there any benefit to holding such a belief. Thus, it is optimal to believe all conscious entities have spirits.
VI.5. It is optimal to believe some lives provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them.
It is optimal to believe God addresses all spirits to the rebirth lives that best facilitate development and continuity of identity (III.10.). Yet insofar as He does not interfere in the lower realm, He can only address spirits there to lives that come available there (I.3.). And as it is optimal to believe all lives are lived by spirits, he must assign a spirit to each (VI.2., VI.4.).
However, the lives available in the lower realm are the accidental consequence of the interaction of free entities (I.3.). So there is no reason they must benefit every spirit that must be addressed to them, much as there is no reason pots containing random minerals must all allow seeds to grow. And the reverse should be our default assumption.
To believe all torturous lives are beneficial for reasons that cannot be verified would amount to blaming the victim when observation weighs against it and reason suggests the contrary is more likely. This is both morally repugnant and difficult to credit. By consequence, it is optimal to believe some lives provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them.
VI.6. It is not optimal to believe lives that provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them must be a punishment for past failures.
We sympathize less with those whose suffering is deserved than those whose suffering is not. If we believe lives that provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them must be a punishment for past failures, our sympathy for those who suffer will be greatly reduced while our inclination to blame apparent victims will be greatly increased. This would degrade our basic moral sensibilities, so that at best our moral duty would be a mere letter. Degradation of basic moral sensibilities is a harm. By consequence, it is not optimal to assume lives that provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them must be a punishment for past failures.
VI.7. It is optimal to believe an early exit is sometimes justifiable.
It is optimal to believe some lives provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them (VI.5.). And it is not optimal to believe lives that provide little or negative value to the spirits who live them must be a punishment for past failures (VI.6.). Nor is it optimal to believe all circumstances present us with genuine tasks (IV.12.). Where there are no genuine tasks, there can be no cost for incompletion (II.20.). So faced with a life he judges with high confidence to be of negative value, a spirit may be correct to deem early exit the best course of action. It follows that an early exit is sometimes justifiable.
VI.8. All spirits residing together in each world of the upper realm must be compossible.
The upper realm is by definition maximally good (D.21.). This implies that every world in the upper realm must be maximally good for all spirits within it and not only for some at the expense of others (V.16.). But if the maximum good of different spirits in the same world is not compossible then it will be good for some at the expense of others. Thus, all spirits residing together in each world of the upper realm must be compossible.
VI.9. Spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will are incompossible.
Spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will cannot live maximally good lives in the same world as other spirits who are also living maximally good lives. Therefore, spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will are incompossible.
VI.10. It is optimal to believe that spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will cannot ascend to the upper realm.
All spirits residing together in each world of the upper realm must be compossible (VI.8.). Therefore, incompossible spirits could only ascend to an empty world in the upper realm. Yet an empty upper world is not maximally good for spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will, as it provides them no one to dominate or harm. By consequence there can be no upper world for them to ascend to. Hence, it is optimal to believe spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will cannot ascend to the upper realm.
VI.11. It is optimal to believe spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will must wander in the lower or middle realm until they develop a compossible entelecheia.
Spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will cannot ascend to the upper realm (VI.10.). If they cannot ascend, they must stay or descend. For there is no reason to believe they are annihilated without any prospect of reform. Thus, it is optimal to believe spirits who are mainly driven by a desire to harm others or dominate them against their will must wander in the lower or middle realm until they develop a compossible entelecheia.
VI.12. It is optimal to believe spirits who place little value in the welfare of others must choose between spending eternity in a flawed world and developing further in the lower or middle realm.
Spirits who place little value in the welfare of others but are not mainly driven by a desire to harm them could co-exist with others in a realm of such abundance that no want puts them at cross-purposes. However, other spirits may not find a world that includes them to be maximally good. By consequence they would be limited to upper worlds that consist of amenable others of their ilk, or entities indifferent to their nature made expressly for the purpose, or both.
Experience informs us that those who are careless of the harm they might do to others are not always keen to associate with others who are equally careless. And it is unclear whether a world consisting solely of entities created expressly to be indifferent to their faults would be an appealing place to spend eternity. Faced with a choice between a flawed eternity and further development in the lower realms for a limited time, it is reasonable to suppose most such spirits will choose to take rebirth in the lower realms until they develop an entelecheia more compossible with other spirits. Hence, it is optimal to believe spirits who place little value in the welfare of others must choose between spending eternity in a flawed world and developing further in the lower or middle realm.
VI.13. It is not optimal to believe all spirits who are bad by human standards are barred from the upper realm.
To assume that God legislates morality in precise accordance with human norms would be arbitrary and incompatible with the optimal account of creation (I.3.). God's intention is to develop the indeterminate, not to tell entities what they must and must not do. Therefore God does not limit entry to the upper realm by whim. Rather, moral fundamentals are enforced by the law of non-contradiction itself (D.13.). Thus, it is not optimal to believe that all spirits who are bad by human standards are barred from the upper realm.
VI.14. It is optimal to believe God recognizes our virtuous behavior and our sacrifices in life.
It is optimal to believe God shares our experiences, empathizes with our struggles, and is always present with us (I.10.). And it is optimal to believe God is omniscient (I.9.). It follows that it is optimal to believe God recognizes our virtuous behavior and our sacrifices in life.
VI.15. It is optimal to believe the compossible dwell together forever in the upper realm when their development is complete.
Compossible spirits living together in the same upper world present no difficulty. And it is optimal to believe we ascend to the upper realm when our development is complete (III.15.). Nor is there any reason to believe we must descend again. For it is optimal to believe the afterlife is as good as it can be (II.4.). Thus, it is optimal to believe the compossible dwell together forever in the upper realm when their development is complete.
VI.16. It is optimal to believe the pursuit of compossible virtues speeds our ascent to the upper realm.
Those who are mainly driven to pursue compossible goods and place value in the welfare of others are compossible and ascend to the upper realm when their development is complete (VI.15.). Those who are not wander longer in the lower and middle realms (VI.11., VI.12.). Pursuing compossible virtues ingrains on us our better characteristics and shapes our entelecheia to favor them. By consequence, it is optimal to believe the pursuit of compossible virtues speeds our ascent to the upper realm.
VI.17. Summary of optimal beliefs regarding moral laws.
God does not arbitrarily enforce human moral standards (VI.13.). Instead, moral fundamentals are enforced by the law of non-contradiction itself (VI.13.). Compossible spirits can ascend to the upper realm (VI.15.), but incompossible spirits cannot (VI.11., VI.12.). To speed our arrival in the upper realm, it behooves us to pursue compossible virtues in our present life (VI.16.).
VII. Faith
VII.1. The set of beliefs identified as optimal in this text agrees with basic religious intuitions.
The basic religious intuitions are that (a.) the spirit survives the death of the body and persists in an afterlife, (b.) divinity exists in some form, and (c.) moral behavior is recognized in some fashion connected to a and b (D.12.). All of the beliefs we have laid out above are either compatible with these points or support them directly. Therefore, the set of beliefs identified as optimal in this text agrees with basic religious intuitions.
VII.2. The optimal religion should be minimal by default.
It is not possible to prove the set of propositions presented here complete and exhaustive. However, changes should only be made with great caution. Almost without exception, tempting additions create hidden contradictions and systemic incoherence. Furthermore, beliefs about unknowables are inherently costly (D.14.). To qualify as optimal they must provide a clear net positive. Thus, the optimal religion should be minimal by default.
VII.3. The set of beliefs identified as optimal in this text constitutes the foundation of the optimal religion.
By definition, the optimal religion does more net good in the present life than any other religion or irreligion and agrees with basic religious intuitions (D.1.). And by definition, the optimal beliefs are the beliefs it includes (D.16.).
The beliefs we have presented here agree with basic religious intuitions (VII.1.). They are also logical consequences that follow from self-evident premises and consensus goods (D.2., D.13.). As a result, the optimal religion necessarily includes them (D.16.). The optimal religion may also include further beliefs not yet deduced. However, because it should be minimal by default, it is unlikely such beliefs are so numerous or important as to significantly alter this foundation (VII.2.).
Thus, the set of beliefs identified as optimal in this text constitutes the foundation of the optimal religion.
VII.4. It is possible to increase one's confidence that a given set of connected claims is true by an act of will if it is neither incompatible with reason nor contradicted by knowns.
Working hypotheses make particular patterns more salient. The salience of these patterns structures further cognition. Further cognition within these derived structures lends further support to the hypothesis. The resulting feedback loop strengthens confidence in the hypothesis unless it encounters a glaring contradiction that forces its rejection. This is why we observe that researchers become more attached to their working hypotheses than can be explained by self-interest.
It is plain that one can choose a working hypothesis. That is, one can choose to regard matters in light of a pattern that might hold within them. Because one can choose a working hypothesis and a working hypothesis neither contradicted by knowns nor incompatible with reason is self-reinforcing, it follows that one can choose to increase one's confidence in any set of connected claims that is neither contradicted by knowns nor incompatible with reason by choosing to adopt it as a working hypothesis.
Thus, it is possible to increase one's confidence that a given set of connected claims is true by an act of will if it is neither incompatible with reason nor contradicted by knowns.
VII.5. It is possible to increase one's confidence that the optimal religion is true by an act of will.
One can increase one's confidence that a given set of connected claims is true by an act of will provided it is compatible with reason and not contradicted by knowns (VII.4.). Optimal beliefs are by design compatible with reason and not contradicted by knowns, and they form a coherent system (D.13., D.1., D.16.). Therefore, one can increase one's confidence that the optimal religion is true by an act of will.
VII.6. Only credible and non-basic religious intuitions could give one sufficient cause to believe some other religion does more net good than the optimal religion when both knowables and unknowables are considered.
By definition belief in the optimal religion does the most knowable net good (D.1.). However, some other set of beliefs could do more net good when unknowables are also considered (D.10., D.15.).
If competing claims about unknowables are not resolved by known goods, they must be resolved by credible religious intuitions. By definition the optimal religion conforms with basic religious intuitions (D.1.). Therefore, only credible and non-basic religious intuitions could give one sufficient cause to believe some other religion does more net good than the optimal religion when both knowables and unknowables are considered.
VII.7. One should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion unless one has credible and non-basic religious intuitions that contradict it.
Only credible and non-basic religious intuitions could give one sufficient cause to believe other religions do more net good than the optimal religion when both knowables and unknowables are considered (VII.6.).
One should do the most net good possible. And it is possible to increase one's confidence that optimal beliefs are true by an act of will (VII.5.). It follows that one should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion unless one has credible and non-basic religious intuitions that contradict it.
VII.8. Non-basic religious intuitions must take the form of personal revelations or trust in an authority's personal revelations.
Non-basic religious intuitions could take two and only two forms. First, a personal revelation that is different from or insists on more concrete detail than basic religious intuitions. Second, the intuition that an authority's account of his own such personal revelation is highly trustworthy. No third form is possible. Thus, non-basic religious intuitions must take the form of personal revelations or trust in an authority's personal revelations.
VII.9. To be credible, personal revelations must be extremely intense and clear or else repeatable and moderately intense and clear.
Cognitive errors are common. So for a personal revelation to be credible, it must distinguish itself from such errors with an intensity and clarity that justify durable confidence in its truth. This intensity and clarity must be great enough to override concern for the contradictory intense and clear revelations experienced by others, as these imply that most such revelations must contain false elements. The standard needs to be particularly high when the revelation in question is unrepeatable. For when an observation cannot be repeated the likelihood that it is an error increases. So to be credible, personal revelations must be extremely intense and clear or else repeatable and moderately intense and clear.
VII.10. One should not consider non-basic religious revelations reported by others credible without an exceptionally strong intuition that those others are trustworthy or a verifiably miraculous demonstration of their authority.
Non-basic religious revelations are inherently dubious because they cannot be demonstrated in this world and regularly contradict each other. So when someone claims to have experienced a non-basic religious revelation, no reasonable person should assume by default that its content is true. Furthermore, charisma increases the ability to lead others into error more than it increases knowledge, insight, or honesty. So reason dictates that one should trust claims by charismatic individuals even less. To override these doubts one would need an exceptionally compelling intuition or demonstration. It follows that one should not consider non-basic religious revelations reported by others credible without an exceptionally strong intuition that those others are trustworthy or a verifiably miraculous demonstration of their authority.
VII.11. No reported miraculous demonstrations provide sufficiently verifiable evidence of authority.
The most verifiable type of miraculous demonstration would be a durable violation of natural law incontestably linked to a particular meaning, such as words permanently emblazoned in the sky. Lower in rank would be a set of clear and specific prophecies that are recorded in writing and unambiguously correspond to events that are widely observed elsewhere at a later date, to a degree that would be effectively impossible by chance alone. The least verifiable type of miraculous demonstration would be a supernatural event said to have been seen by someone to have occurred somewhere long ago, though disputed even at the time by others.
While God could easily produce the most verifiable type if He so chose, it is a matter of fact that only the least verifiable type are reported to us. When only the least verifiable evidence is reported although the most verifiable should be easily produced, a reasonable investigator will assume the former deceptive as well as unverifiable. Hence, no reported miraculous demonstrations provide sufficiently verifiable evidence of authority.
VII.12. Given the choice between a reasonable and maximally beneficial elaboration of intuition and an unreasonable and less beneficial elaboration, one always can and should choose the former.
Systematic elaborations can be more or less reasonable and more or less beneficial without contradicting the intuitions at their base. Reason and benefit are goods (D.2.). And more good is tautologically better than less good. Therefore, given the choice between a reasonable and maximally beneficial elaboration of intuition and an unreasonable and less beneficial elaboration, one always can and should choose the former.
VII.13. Most people should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
Non-basic religious intuitions must take the form of personal revelations or trust in an authority's personal revelations (VII.8.). To be credible, personal revelations must be extremely intense and clear or else repeatable and moderately intense and clear (VII.9.). Hardly anyone has had non-basic revelations of this sort. Furthermore, one should not consider non-basic religious revelations reported by others credible without an exceptionally strong intuition that those others are trustworthy or a verifiably miraculous demonstration of their authority (VII.10.). However, no reported miraculous demonstrations provide verifiable evidence of authority (VII.11.). And so numerous are the cases of believers led into loss by the false promises of charismatic individuals that a reasonable person could scarcely set the bar for trustworthiness too high. Few reasonable people will consider anyone trustworthy enough to pass this high standard.
One should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion unless one has credible and non-basic religious intuitions that contradict it (VII.7.). And most people do not have such intuitions. It follows that most people should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
VII.14. Those inspired to genuine faith and feeling by basic religious intuitions should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
Basic religious intuitions are by definition few in number and limited in scope (D.12.). Hence, they are not sufficient to reveal a complete system of belief on their own. So if one wants these intuitions to shape one's wider view of existence, one must elaborate them in some fashion.
It is a general rule that those inspired to genuine faith and feeling by religious intuitions want those intuitions to shape their wider view of existence. Given the choice between a reasonable and maximally beneficial elaboration of intuition and an unreasonable and less beneficial elaboration, one always can and should choose the former (VII.12.). Therefore, those inspired to genuine faith and feeling by religious intuitions should choose the former.
The optimal religion is in full agreement with basic religious intuitions (VII.1.). And it is by definition the most reasonable and beneficial set of beliefs in such agreement (D.1., D.13.). Therefore, those inspired to genuine faith and feeling by basic religious intuitions should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
VII.15. Those who hope to be inspired to genuine faith and feeling by basic religious intuitions in the future should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
Those inspired to genuine faith and feeling by basic religious intuitions should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion (VII.14.). And one should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion unless one has credible and non-basic religious intuitions that contradict it (VII.7.). So a fortiori, those who hope to be inspired to genuine faith and feeling by basic religious intuitions in the future should make a willful effort to believe in the optimal religion.
VII.16. One need not have high confidence the optimal religion is true to benefit from belief.
Belief affects one's behavior, attitudes, and understanding even at a low level of confidence. For instance, suppose you believe with low confidence that a man is dangerous. You will interpret his movements differently, behave more cautiously, and feel less relaxed. If low-confidence beliefs lead to behaviors that are beneficial on net, then one will benefit on net despite one's low confidence. Thus, one need not have high confidence the optimal religion is true to benefit from belief.
VII.17. One will benefit most if one believes in the optimal religion with high but not absolute confidence.
If beliefs are beneficial then high confidence in those beliefs is more beneficial than low confidence in those beliefs. And optimal beliefs are beneficial by definition (D.1.).
Nevertheless, there always remains a possibility that the logic supporting purportedly beneficial beliefs contains some unnoticed flaw. Absolute confidence would prevent one from noticing or acknowledging such a flaw and make correction difficult and psychologically wrenching. This cognitive closure does harm in the long run. Furthermore, unknowables are unknowable. Even after the optimal religion is perfected by the polish of time, one should remain humble in the face of the unknowable. It follows that one will benefit most if one believes in the optimal religion with high but not absolute confidence.
VII.18. Religion cannot solve most of our problems.
Religious beliefs can encourage us, comfort us, and enable us to relate to our problems in a more positive way. These are real benefits. But religious beliefs are by definition beliefs about unknowables (D.11.). Most problems concern knowables and are unaffected by beliefs about unknowables. Thus, religion cannot solve most of our problems.
VII.19. We understand an object more completely when we cognize it in more modalities.
We understand objects in multiple modalities. Furthermore, when we cognize the same object in multiple modalities we can understand it at a higher order of abstraction than any single modality permits.
For instance, we understand a flute through a spatial grasp of its geometry, mathematical formulae that describe its properties, its feel in our hands, the sound it produces, discursive statements that can be made about it, and so forth. By generalizing across these modalities we arrive at a higher-order understanding of what a flute is, even though we can only express that understanding in one modality at a time.
Understanding is not identical to the ability to make accurate discursive statements. For the latter occurs within a single modality that cannot fully capture the others. Consider for example that an LLM can make more accurate discursive statements about the taste of nectar than a bird, but can neither understand nor cognize the taste of nectar as such.
Thus, we understand an object more completely when we cognize it in more modalities.
VII.20. We are more affected by objects we cognize in more modalities.
Experience informs us that the affective impact of an object normally increases when we cognize it in more modalities. For instance, winter has a stronger affective impact if we feel its chill than if our understanding of that chill is purely discursive. Thus, we are more affected by objects we cognize in more modalities.
VII.21. An object that is inaccessible to experience and only described discursively can only be cognized in non-discursive modalities by means of imagined presentations.
An object that is inaccessible to experience and only described discursively cannot be cognized in other modalities through real experience. However, it can be cognized in other modalities by imaginatively generating the object or some meaningfully analogous object in those modalities on the basis of the description. For instance, a black swan that is inaccessible to real experience can be visualized, represented in depictions, or evoked in music. We will broadly refer to these as imagined presentations, without implying they are necessarily true or false. Hence, an object that is inaccessible to experience and only described discursively can only be cognized in non-discursive modalities by means of imagined presentations.
VII.22. Imagined presentations in non-discursive modalities make religious beliefs more affecting and allow us to understand them more completely.
An object that is inaccessible to experience and only described discursively can only be cognized in non-discursive modalities by means of imagined presentations (VII.21.). We understand an object more completely and are affected by it more deeply when we cognize it in more modalities (VII.19., VII.20.). Religious beliefs pertain to objects that are described discursively but not accessible to experience in the present world (D.11.). It follows that imagined presentations in non-discursive modalities make religious beliefs more affecting and allow us to understand them more completely.
VII.23. It is optimal to cognize the beliefs of the optimal religion by means of imagined presentations in non-discursive modalities.
The optimal religion has been worked out in a purely discursive modality. Imagined presentations in non-discursive modalities make religious beliefs more affecting and allow us to understand them more completely (VII.22.). The benefits of belief are a function of affect and understanding. By definition the optimal religion must provide the maximum possible benefit in the present world (D.1.). Therefore, it is optimal to cognize the beliefs of the optimal religion by means of imagined presentations in non-discursive modalities.
VII.24. The production of effective imagined presentations in all relevant modalities is a slow process that cannot be completed in this text.
Imagination is not the province of pure logic. Imagined presentations must be built up by a different sort of mental labor. To do this well takes time. Furthermore, some of the most potent imagined presentations can only be instantiated with capital expenditures that require a large or wealthy community of supportive believers. To form such a community also takes time. Thus, the production of effective imagined presentations in all relevant modalities is a slow process that cannot be completed in this text.
VII.25. The method of loci can be adapted to conveniently cognize the optimal religion in several non-discursive modalities.
The production of effective imagined presentations in all relevant modalities is a slow process that cannot be completed in this text (VII.24.). Both despite and because of this, some ready and convenient starting point is desirable.
The method of loci is the most effective known visualization practice. It is straightforward, requires no labor or expense, and is not fundamentally tied to any existing system of beliefs. Furthermore, because the liminal realm is by nature dreamlike, internally focused, and situated between imagination and reality, it is an especially appropriate setting for the memory palace (D.23., V.5.). These strengths recommend the method of loci as a framework for cognizing the optimal religion in a non-discursive modality (VII.23.).
One can adapt the method as follows. One visualizes oneself in a building with particular personal resonance. One gives the meditation focus by reconstructing a precise mental image of this building as an object in the mind, including all details. Then one visualizes it to be situated in a landscape of the liminal realm. Within this visualized location one tries to sense the presence of God. And one also tries to sense a wide sweep of past and future lives unfolding before and behind, albeit without giving them inappropriate specificity. Finally, one recalls that the goal of developing one's entelecheia (D.6.) is completable but entails a diverse and chaotic pathway with many intervening tasks (IV.14.).
This adaptation of the method of loci accomplishes three goals. First, it makes optimal beliefs stronger and more impactful by cognizing them in visual, spatial, and narrative modalities (VII.23.). Second, it psychologically anchors one in an expanded range of time during which the present life is only a single part of a larger journey toward a meaningful goal (IV.18., III.15.). This context attenuates psychological distress caused by present struggles. Third, it cultivates a sense of divine presence. Divine presence is an explicit optimal belief, but holding the discursive belief alone is not sufficient to make it sensible (I.10., VII.20., VII.21.).
This liminal-home meditation is offered as a ready and convenient means without implying any logical necessity to employ it.
VII.26. The optimal religion remains to be completed.
At the time of writing, the optimal religion remains deficient in three domains. These are imagined presentations, community, and localized ethics.
Traditional religions delineate, regulate, and educate communities. They incorporate guidelines for living that are theologically spurious, but effective in the local circumstances that prevailed at their origin, and largely continue to prevail in the present. And they deploy a panoply of imagined presentations that make their underlying principles affecting and intuitive.
The spread of any given religion is principally determined by its efficacy in these three domains. But because they are not amenable to logical deduction from general principles, they cannot be solved in this text.
VII.27. One should proselytize the optimal religion to amenable friends and allies at the time appropriate to their capacity for understanding.
It is good to benefit friends and allies. Therefore, it is good to persuade them to hold beliefs that will benefit them (D.2.). Furthermore, experience informs us that beliefs become stronger when shared. So when beliefs that provide non-exclusive benefits are shared, the benefits increase. And the beliefs of the optimal religion provide non-exclusive benefits.
Nevertheless, at the time of writing the optimal religion remains to be completed (VII.26.). Because we have worked it out here by logical deduction, it is inaccessible to the large majority. Even if this limitation were overcome, many would reject it intransigently on the basis of prior commitments. In such cases proselytizing would do more harm than good. By consequence, one should proselytize the optimal religion to amenable friends and allies at the time appropriate to their capacity for understanding.
VII.28. Conclusion and invitation.
A minute fraction of readers will have the wherewithal to follow the argument we have presented and accept its validity without the assistance of social or imaginative scaffolding (VII.26.). The task of filling the aforementioned gaps falls to you. History teaches us that it is a slow process. Until it is done, this text will register to the rest as a dubious philosophical curiosity. Know that, and endure it. In the fullness of time, the unrelenting gravity of reason will have its way.
May 4th, 2026.
Addenda
The following propositions are inessential to the main line of argument, but of sufficient interest to justify inclusion.
A.1. A refutation of the multiverse theodicy.
The multiverse theodicy claims a maximally good God would create every possible net-good world. The problem of evil would then be solved because some net-good worlds include local evils. However, this theodicy fails for two reasons. First, it implies probabilities that diverge from those we observe to a nearly impossible degree. Second, it implies our choices are never meaningful.
Consider a world that contains observers and will remain good on net regardless of whether a given coin lands on heads, tails, or on its edge. According to the multiverse theodicy God must create a world where it lands on heads, another world where it lands on tails, and a third world where it lands on its edge. Because each of these three worlds contains the same observers, the chance that a randomly selected observer is in a world where the coin lands on its edge is one in three.
To generalize, the multiverse theodicy implies that all possible outcomes are equally likely to occur in the world of a randomly chosen observer. However, in the present world the likelihood of each outcome is skewed in a consistent way. That is, coins almost never land on their edge. So the probability that the multiverse theodicy is true approaches zero as the number of repeated chance events with observed outcomes in unequal ratios increases. Every time a flipped coin does not land on its edge, the multiverse theodicy is proven more and more wrong.
Proponents can attempt to escape this reasoning by proposing that probabilities like those we observe in our world are a condition of possibility for the existence of observers themselves. But this plainly does not apply to all the probabilistic events we observe. And even one type of event with unequal outcome ratios is still sufficient to prove the multiverse theodicy wrong.
Another attempt to save the multiverse theodicy is to assume God creates more copies of some worlds than others in order to ensure probabilities are matched to their frequency. However, this defense fails because it implies God did not create worlds He could have created. If He could create so many heads worlds, then He could create so many edge worlds too, and by the premise of the theodicy is obliged to. The existence of irrational probabilities further exposes the extravagance of substituting ratios of countables for probabilities.
The multiverse theodicy is not only empirically false. It is deeply suboptimal as well. For if every possible net-good world exists, an evil deed I do not do in this world will be done in another by someone essentially identical to me, and vice versa. My individual actions to improve my world therefore have no impact on the net good of the multiverse, which is constant. That means I am morally justified in doing exactly as I please at any given moment.
For instance, imagine two worlds that are net-good and identical in every respect except that in one I kick a cat and in the other I do not. In the multiverse theodicy it is irrelevant whether I do or do not kick a cat, because whatever I do in this world I will do the opposite in the other world. That is, regardless of my decision to act morally or immorally, the cat will always be both kicked and unkicked.
This implies a further problem. If every possible net-good world exists, then there is no freedom. For if my counterpart were to choose not to kick the cat I would be forced to kick it, without which the two worlds would be identical and one possible world would not exist. Thus, if God desires freedom for his creatures he cannot create every possible net-good world.
The multiverse theodicy would be suboptimal even if it did solve the problem of evil. And it does not. Its primary value is as a reductio proof demonstrating that God must not create every possible net-good world, but some much smaller number. From here one should see that every world in the set of all possible net-good worlds that God does not create increases the amount of freedom in the remaining worlds, down to a limit of one. Freedom is therefore maximized when the number of worlds God creates is exactly one.
A.2. There is one and only one universe and it ends without repeating.
As dice throws are repeated the ratio of outputs approaches perfect predictability, such that one could have chosen them in advance and arrived at an indistinguishable result. With a single dice throw, the ratio of outputs has the minimum predictability, such that choosing them in advance would be minimally likely to give an indistinguishable result. In the former case the probability of redundant outputs rises from the second throw and already reaches one by the seventh throw. In the latter, it is zero.
This example illustrates a general principle. When the output of a system can be predetermined on the basis of the probabilities in that system, the freedom of the system cannot be better than nominal. So creating infinite probabilistic universes is at best nominally different from predetermining infinite universes. Probabilistic universes are maximally free and minimally redundant when there is only one of them.
This also applies temporally. A probabilistic universe is maximally free and minimally redundant when it never cycles back through any previously occurring state. A universe that contains a finite number of bits or that can only be perceived with a finite resolution is maximally free and minimally redundant when its duration is finite.
Deterministic universes can still be considered free in a sense if they have indeterminate starting points. But then same argument applies to the starting points themselves. They are maximally free and minimally redundant when there is only one starting point. Similarly, if multiple universes were created with different rules, there would still be a reduction in freedom insofar as different rulesets have a different probability of generating viable universes. This simply replicates the fixed distribution problem on a different structural level.
Thus, n=1 maximizes freedom and originality. This is the other side of the law of large numbers.
Because a solution to the problem of evil requires freedom (I.2.), it precludes an infinite number of universes for all the reasons just stated. And as there is no known attractor between infinity and one that would justify a reduction in freedom and originality, we must assume by default that there is only one universe and that it does not cycle.
This opens the question of why the one universe has the duration and amount of information it does rather than more or less. It is self-evident that in a system of random bits, each additional bit decreases the predictability of the total state space. Yet at the same time, each additional bit increases the predictability and redundancy of subsets of that state space for the reasons just given. This means predictability and redundancy are a function of the size of the set one considers relevant, and to minimize them the total state space should exactly equal that size. But relevance cannot be determined in the abstract. So it is impossible for mathematical reasoning alone to resolve the question.
Notwithstanding this, there are two ways God could determine the optimal amount of information in the universe. First, he could arbitrarily deem some set size more relevant than others. Second, the fundamental order of the universe itself could force an exact size, or make it superior to all other possible sizes for reasons independent of size as such. (By analogy, biological organisms have a non-arbitrary optimal size range because heat loss is a function of the surface-area-to-volume ratio.) As the first would be arbitrary, we hypothesize the second to be the case. The number of unknowns prevents us from resolving the question more completely.
We have written universe in this proposition to facilitate general discussion. In the language of the present text this amounts to world, and the points just made apply only to the lower realm (D.20., I.3., III.7.). For the other realms do not require freedom in the same way. Instead they are sized and multiplied to optimally accommodate the undetermined spirits generated in the lower realm.
In sum, it is optimal to believe that there is only one world in the lower realm, that it has a finite duration and does not repeat cyclically, and that it must be precisely the size it is either on account of its fundamental rules or optimality incidental to size as such.
A.3. The end of the lower realm need not irremediably cut short the development of spirits.
If there is only one lower world and it ends without repeating (A.2.), then it must come to an end at some finite time that may not be coordinated with the completion of spirits' development. As spirits must achieve a satisfactory level of development to ascend, this uncoordinated endpoint could plausibly cut many of them off prematurely.
There are two ways this difficulty could be solved. First, the order of rebirths could be other than the normal order of time. As God is omnipotent, there is no reason to think He need be restricted to linear time (I.8.). Second, God could create a closed undetermined world in the middle realm expressly to permit the completion of the stranded spirits' initial stage of development. Between these the first solution is more elegant, more consistent, and better in keeping with God's intention (I.3.). It also allows rebirth addressing to be better targeted (III.10.). Hence, we should consider it the preferred solution.
A.4. It is not optimal to believe spirits must live animal lives prior to more advanced ones.
There is no logical necessity for spirits to live animal lives prior to more advanced ones. Nor would the belief that they do provide any meaningful benefits. Furthermore, such a belief would require that the number of animal lives ever lived always exceed the number of more advanced lives ever lived. This is an empirical assertion not guaranteed to remain true in our world.
We could suppose our world shares lives with other worlds whose nature guarantees the implicitly asserted floor in animal lives. But that multiplies beliefs while still providing no meaningful benefits. And the benefits of every belief must always exceed the cost (D.13., D.14.). Therefore, it is not optimal to believe spirits must live animal lives prior to more advanced ones.
A.5. Each spirit co-selects his tasks after rather than before his first life.
It is optimal to believe each spirit co-selects his tasks with God (IV.7.). But before his first life, he lacks any traits (I.3.). By consequence he lacks preferences that could meaningfully guide task selection. It is therefore impossible for him to participate in the latter. This problem is easily solved by supposing each spirit begins from a random life and then retrospectively identifies tasks appropriate to that first life on the basis of the entelecheia he has developed within that life. These tasks will then carry forward to his future lives. Thus, each spirit co-selects his tasks after rather than before his first life.
A.6. Identity and the physical brain.
In the future it might be possible to clone individuals and closely replicate their brain structure in these clones upon the death of their original body. In principle this is no different from the manufacture of identical twins. And just as there is no reason to believe identical twins share the same consciousness and observation informs us they do not, there is no reason to think a clone would share the same consciousness as the individual cloned. If a clone is produced before the cloned dies, this will be self-evident.
Nor should we assume that timing the awakening of a clone to closely follow the death of the cloned ensures the same spirit will transfer from one to the next, or even makes it likely. Restricting the range of experience in this way would have a deleterious effect on a spirit's development (III.11.). And rebirth lives are selected to facilitate development (III.10.). Thus, such a rebirth is unlikely a priori.
It might become possible to cryogenically preserve individuals and revive them long after they are deceased according to some technical medical definition. In this case we should assume the spirit does remain with the body. Intuition and experience inform us that a particular spirit ties itself to a particular configuration of matter. To suppose it could leap to some other configuration of matter while the first is intact would lead to strange and incoherent consequences. If the relevant configuration of matter is paused rather than destroyed, we lack sufficient cause to assume the spirit departs.
Similarly, if a brain is mechanically reconfigured using advanced medicine with no intervening death, we should assume the same spirit remains despite the resulting changes to its personality. This neither refutes nor interrupts the rebirth process we have already laid out.
If a brain is damaged to the point that we might deem the subject deceased, but then the very same matter reconfigured into a new and living brain by some advanced technology, we are at a loss as to whether the same spirit remains at the end of the process, or whether it departs for rebirth. For the precise point where the relevant configuration of matter has been disfigured enough for the spirit to depart is unknown, and very likely unknowable.
In all these cases we see that the spirit is distinct from the specific character it takes on during a given life or at a given time in that life. Its primary continuity is one of narrative, trajectory, and developing character in the liminal realm, not nearness to a fixed cluster of characteristics in the lower realm. So complete continuity in the lower realm can never be guaranteed.
A.7. Development is not the same as acquiring knowledge and skills as such.
In the future it might be possible to directly deposit knowledge distilled from the experience of many wise and skilled individuals into one's brain through technological means and without need for direct experience. One might assume this would immediately complete development and enable rapid ascent to the upper realm without any intervening cost for death. However, development is the creation and realization of entelecheia, not the perfection of general knowledge or skills as such (D.7.). These are distinct things, and the latter neither imply nor are necessary for the former. By the same token, artificial injection of knowledge and skills is unlikely to advance one's development to a remarkable degree.
For instance, a spirit who is a carpenter in one life and a mathematician in another does not create and realize his entelecheia by achieving flawless mastery of carpentry or complete knowledge of mathematics. He does so by coming to understand his own relation to carpentry, mathematics, and the world as one sees it when engaging with these fields. Moreover, the development process requires the integration of perspectives from diverse siloed lives into a unified viewpoint in the liminal realm (V.5., V.6.). Merely injecting knowledge and skills in the lower realm cannot accomplish any of the above.
This is not to say that such technological injection of knowledge would necessarily be good or bad. That question must be considered on its own terms within an individual life. But it does not provide a shortcut to the upper realm, because development as we use the term is not the same as acquiring knowledge or skills as such.
A.8. Machine intelligence and consciousness.
Machines can be made to mimic conscious intelligence while remaining too simple to have either. Such mimicry demonstrates both that entities which seem to be conscious are not necessarily so, and that we are much too easily tempted to conclude they are. This should inspire caution.
We can infer by analogy with ourselves that other biological creatures with an advanced nervous system have consciousness. But extending this analogy to any entity that processes data is unnecessary, extravagant, and hard to credit. To be clear, our earlier assertion that any entity which can harbor consciousness does harbor consciousness (VI.2.) is not an assertion that machines are such entities. It only forbids zombies of the usual sort.
Strictly speaking, whether a machine intelligence can have consciousness is unknowable. That makes it a matter of religious belief rather than scientific knowledge (D.11.). And the belief that machines can have consciousness is not only dubious. It is also far more likely to hurt us than help us. It puts us at risk of being crowded out while offering us no benefits whatsoever. By consequence, it is optimal to believe machines cannot have consciousness.
A.9. Religion and natural selection.
If faith in a given religion brings about an increase in moral behavior within a population while there is a reproductive advantage for those inclined to immoral behavior, the religion will cause the faith and moral inclinations of that population to gradually decline on a biological level due to natural selection. And if these conditions are not remedied for an extended time, the religion will do net harm to the population regardless of how much good it did in the short term. Thus, if a religion is to do good rather than harm to a population it must maintain or increase the reproductive ratio of the moral to the immoral within that population, or bring about the same result by means of genetic engineering. This applies to other virtues as well.
Maximizing reproductive output in the modern environment is unlikely to be an appropriate realization of the entelecheia of the members of the community. Thus, in the long run it is not an appropriate method for achieving the moral ratios discussed above. By the same token one is arguably obliged to prevent the evolution of such maximization, which is inevitable in the long run in the absence of intervention. It goes without saying that diminution to the point of extinction is also to be prevented.
These matters must be considered when instantiating the fundamental moral principles of the optimal religion in practical ethics agreed on by the community. Broadly, the community should seek justice, reward the righteous, and punish iniquitous behavior with appropriate and proportionate material consequences rather than adopting a laissez-faire attitude. And this applies to the entire population, not believers alone.
As communities and institutions can be and often are wrong and the wicked inevitably capture their leadership due to a competitive advantage in navigating institutional structures and manipulating crowds, power should be relinquished to them only with carefully considered limitations and fail-safes. Furthermore, one should not lose sight of the fact that we evaluate optimality from the individual perspective. No community or institution can ever infringe on this principle. Discussing these issues in any further detail is a large undertaking best left to others.
A.10. The mind-body problem is not relevant to the optimal beliefs we have put forth above.
No viable approach to the mind-body problem would render our account of consciousness, spirits, and rebirth impossible. For if one accepts idealism, one can consider each spirit akin to single persistent consciousness whose contents are ordered by the same consistencies that govern all others and which experiences a discontinuity between lives. And if one accepts materialism, believing that consciousnesses in the lower realm emerge from a more fundamental mode of existence called matter and are wholly destroyed when that matter is disrupted, then God can still address spirits to experience those consciousnesses upon birth and address them elsewhere upon death (III.8.). Thus, the mind-body problem is not relevant to the optimal beliefs we have put forth above.
A.11. Idealism is the optimal solution to the mind-body problem.
The answer to the mind-body problem is in the strict sense unknowable. Notwithstanding the previous proposition, that means the solution is a matter of religious belief (D.11.). Thus, it should be evaluated by the same criteria as other religious beliefs. And by these criteria idealism is the optimal solution. For it is more reasonable than the alternatives and entails more net benefits as well.
In idealism matter is only a consistency in the contents of consciousnesses, and the laws formulated by science are a description of the universal consistencies governing the contents of all consciousnesses in a world. This view is not hostile to science or reason. It maintains that the consistencies science discovers are real. They simply do not refer to objects that exist independently from consciousnesses. Idealism is also fully compatible with the view that all contents of consciousness in this world have consistent correlates that follow natural laws and are observable in principle (D.20., III.7.).
Other attempts to solve the mind-body problem encounter a so-called hard problem of consciousness that does not exist in idealism. And because they cannot solve it, they are forced into handwaving and superfluous assumptions. The hard problem is an illusion produced by misinterpreting consistencies within consciousnesses as a more fundamental mode of reality that exists outside of any consciousnesses and produces them. How or why it produces them then appears to be insolubly mysterious. This is not a paradox, but self-mystification.
Some object that idealism eliminates handwaving over the hard problem of consciousness only at the price of significantly greater complexity and awkward explanations, and that this amounts to a Pyrrhic victory. However, the objection cannot be sustained. Parsimony is a virtue. But simplicity that requires handwaving is inferior to complexity that eliminates it. The same objection could be used to reject heliocentrism, with the same validity. While the conceptual framework of idealism is too inconvenient for daily or even broad scientific use and not recommendable for those purposes on practical grounds, it remains the only correct one.
All of the above was explained long ago and in detail by Berkeley, whose foundational account of idealism remains the best because it is the most radical and parsimonious. Those who dislike his use of the word God can replace it at will with a principle of universal harmonization governing all consciousnesses within a world. This is no more mystical than the principle that all bodies follow the rules of gravity, which is itself a subset of the principle of universal harmonization. So the true hard problem of consciousness is to determine why the intervening centuries have been spent filling libraries with deficient alternatives while dismissing a superior explanation already given.
Agreement with reason is not the only advantage of idealism. Almost all other attempts to solve the mind-body problem imply in one way or another that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. This devalues it relative to the supposedly prior matter to which it is epiphenomenal. Since consciousness comprises everything we have, devaluing it at the expense of some other thing that has no particular value to us is a harm. In contrast, idealism interprets consciousness as the primary and indeed only level of reality. This increases the value of consciousness, which benefits us. We have already expanded on that argument with respect to the simulation hypothesis (VI.1.). Materialism and the simulation hypothesis are fundamentally similar in their harmful subordination of our conscious experience to some other level of reality whose existence cannot be demonstrated.
Some forms of dualism do stop short of making consciousness epiphenomenal. However, they remain inferior to idealism because they still reify consistencies within consciousnesses into a superfluous mode of being that either remains subject to the hard problem or exists only noumenally. That is extravagant and unparsimonious at best.
In sum, idealism is superior to all alternative solutions to the mind-body problem on rational grounds and offers superior benefits as well. Thus, it is optimal to believe idealism is true.
